Over which firms perform. It is ever-present in

the past decades, the challenges of corporate governance continue to influence
the way in which firms perform. It is ever-present in the conflicts of
interest, differences in decision-making and the rise of residual losses
(Jensen and Meckling 1976: 310). These challenges, or agency costs, are so
far-reaching in firms that it is inevitable to search for reasons which explain
the impact. Even as mechanisms of corporate governance unfolds – the market
calls for an internal device which aims to control agency costs efficiently,
and so, acts as a response to competitors (Fama 1980: 289). That is, the board
of directors whose task is to approve, evaluate, and advise in decision-making
as a method to minimise the risks related to a firm’s survival (Fama and Jensen
1983a; 1983b). It is exactly why the role of boards matter, and its place in
corporate governance looks to reveal some common threads, that firms should
take strides and assess its boards in a narrower, more balanced perspective. In
such case, the focus is far from what corporate boards do, and rather to
recognise how changes in director selection characterises their effectiveness
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1988: 589). This is somewhat of a debate in itself, as
who gets selected is key to unlock the nature of firms and reflects the controversies
in recent reforms to board practices (Baysinger and Butler 1985). Except it is
for a fact that these issues stand out as a dynamic aspect of firms, hence, renews
the interest to a setting which falls short of both its needs and
opportunities. It brings to fore, the question as to how boards can improve their
effectiveness that is so long at a crossroads – to be aware of financial
results which take the impact; and its means that shape corporate governance
(Zahra and Pearce 1989: 291).